State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy by Grodin, Joseph R. & Beeson, Duane B.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
1964
State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy
Joseph R. Grodin
UC Hastings College of the Law, grodinj@uchastings.edu
Duane B. Beeson
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph R. Grodin and Duane B. Beeson, State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy, 52 Cal. L. Rev. 95 (1964).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/219
Faculty Publications
UC Hastings College of the Law Library
Author: Joseph R. Grodin
Title: State Right–to–Work Laws and Federal Labor Policy
Source: California Law Review
Citation: 52 Cal. L. Rev. 95 (1964).
Originally published in CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW. This article is reprinted with permission from 
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW and University of California, Berkeley Law (Boalt Hall).
Grodin Joseph
State Right-to-Work Laws and Federal
Labor Policy
Joseph R. Grodin* and Duane B. Beesont
C ONGRESS in the Labor Management Relations Act' has adopted a na-
tional policy toward labor-management relations, and has entrusted
the administration of that policy "to a centralized administrative agency,
armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowl-
edge and cumulative experience." ' In order to avoid the danger of state
interference with national policy, state courts and agencies must yield to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board with
respect to any activity that is "arguably" protected by section 7 3 or pro-
hibited by section 81 of the Act. This is the general catechism of the fed-
eral preemption doctrine as taught by the Supreme Court.5
In the context of that teaching, the application of state "right-to-work"
*B.A., 1951, University of California, Berkeley; LL.B., 1954, Yale University; Ph.D.,
1959, University of London; Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College of the Law;
Member, California Bar.
t B.A., 1945, Lafayette College; LL.B., 1948, Harvard University; Member, California Bar.
161 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. IV 1963) [hereinafter discussed as the Act].
This article is concerned with only the status of the right-to-work laws under the Act.
The union shop provisions of the Railway Labor Act, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1958), have been held to supercede state laws in the union security area. Railway Employees'
Dep't, AFL v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
2 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
3 Section 7 of the Act provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from
any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agree-
ment requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 8(a) (3)." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
4 Section 8 sets forth both employer and union unfair labor practices. 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV 1963).
G San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). See cases cited note
71 infra. For a general discussion of the preemption doctrine, see Hafer, A Pragmatic Article
Concerning Federal Preemption and Labor Law, 1960 WIs. L. REv. 279; Ratner, New Devel-
opments in Federal-State Jurisdiction, 15 N.Y.U. CoNp. ON LABOR 47 (1962); Wellington,
Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. Cni L. REv. 542 (1959).
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laws' within the area of Labor Board jurisdiction7 is an anomaly, for Con-
6 The term "right-to-work" is normally used to describe statutes or constitutional pro-
visions that prohibit the requirement of union membership as a condition of employment.
Twenty states have such laws: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. Louisiana has a right-to-work
statute applicable only to agricultural workers. For reference to the specific statutes, see 4
LAB. REL. REP. (1 S.L.L.) 16 (1963). The constitutionality of such laws was upheld in
Plumbers Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
Right-to-work laws differ widely, however, with respect to scope and remedies. Some con-
sist simply of a constitutional amendment to the effect that the right of persons to work shall
not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor organiza-
tion. E.g., FrA. CONST. DECL. OF Rvs. § 12; KAN. CoNsT. art. 15, § 12. Most laws declare
agreements in conflict with that policy unlawful. E.g., GA. CODE Am. § 54-905 (1961); IoWA
CODE ANN. § 736-A-3 (1950). In addition, some laws prohibit: (1) "combinations" or "con-
spiracies" to deprive persons of employment because of non-membership, e.g., ALA. CODE
tit. 26, § 375 (2) (1958) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 613.280 (1957) ; (2) strikes or picketing for the
purpose of inducing an illegal agreement, e.g., ARIz. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1303(B) (1956) ;
S.C. CODE § 40-46.6(1) (1962) ; (3) denial of employment to any person because of member-
-ship or nonmembership, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 40-68 (1953); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-2
(Supp. 1963) ; (4) conspiracy to cause the discharge or denial of employment to an individual
by inducing other persons to refuse to work with him because he is a non-member, e.g., Auz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-1305 (1956); NEV. REv. STAT. § 613.280 (1957). With respect to rem-
edies, most laws provide for damages to persons injured by a violation, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 6984.5(f) (1958) ; IND. AivN. STAT. §40-2706 (Supp. 1963) ; many provide for injunctions,
e.g., IoWA CODE ANN. § 736.7 (1950) ; GA. CODE AzNN. § 54-908 (1961) ; and some make viola-
tion a misdemeanor subject to criminal penalties, e.g., S.D. CODE § 17.9914 (Supp. 1960);
TENN. CODE AzN. § 50-212 (1955).
Many right-to-work laws appear to go beyond a prohibition against making union mem-
bership or non-membership a condition of employment. For example, several laws prohibit
"any agreement or combination between any employer and any labor union or labor organiza-
tion whereby persons not members of such union or organization shall be denied the right
to work for said employer, or whereby such membership is made a condition of employment
or continuation of employment by such employer or whereby any such union or organization
acquires an employment monopoly in any enterprise," e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26 § 375(2) (1958) ;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-79 (1958). Similarly, some laws proscribe requirements of membership
in or "affiliation with" a labor organization as a condition of employment, e.g., ARK. STAT.
ANNtr. § 81-202 (1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-208 (1955). Many expressly prohibit a require-
ment that an individual pay "dues, fees, or other charges of any kind to a union as a condi-
tion of employment," e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-82 (1958); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16-10
(Supp. 1963). Several contain a prohibition against compelling a person to join a union or
strike against his will by threatened or actual interference with his person, family, or prop-
erty, e.g., ARiZ. REv. STAT. Az. § 23-1304 (1956); S.D. CODE § 17.1101 (4) (Supp. 1960).
Even further afield, some laws appear to sanction individual bargaining in the face of col-
lective bargaining, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-201 (1960); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5207a(1)
(1962).
In addition to the right-to-work states, some states have laws regulating union security
agreements more restrictively than does federal law, without prohibiting them. For example,
Colorado and Wisconsin condition the validity of union shop agreements upon approval by
a specified percentage of employees, in excess of a majority. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-5-6
(1) (c) (1953); Wis. STAT. ANNi. § 111.06(1)(c)1. (1957).
7 Under the 1959 amendments to the Act, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (1) (2)
(Supp. IV 1963), states may assert jurisdiction over labor disputes which the Board, applying
[Vol. 52:95
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gress has adopted a national policy with respect to union security:8 Any
activity directed toward conditioning employment on union membership
is, depending upon whether it is channeled through a union shop clause
permitted by the proviso to section 8 (a) (3),1 either protected by section 7
or prohibited by section 8. It is an anomaly, however, that Congress was
apparently willing to accept, for, at the same time that it enacted restric-
tions on union security in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947,10 Congress also
adopted Section 14 (b), which provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or ap-
plication of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution
or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."1
its monetary jurisdictional yardsticks, declines to accept. The jurisdictional yardsticks are
listed in 1 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff 1610 (1963).
8 The term "union security" is used to refer to arrangements which require union mem-
bership as a condition of initial or continued employment. The term includes: (1) the dosed
shop, whereby an individual must be a union member to get a job; (2) the full union shop,
whereby employees must join the union within a certain period, typically within 30 days of
hiring; (3) the modified union shop, exempting old employees who are not already members,
or allowing escape periods for withdrawal from membership; (4) maintenance of member-
ship, requiring that persons who become union members remain so; or (5) equivalents.
0 Section 8(a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encour-
age or discourage membership in any labor organization." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1958). Section 8(b) (2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee
in violation of 8(a)(3). 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1958). The proviso to
8(a) (3), commonly known as the "union shop" proviso, reads as follows: "Provided, That
nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer
from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employ-
ment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employ-
ment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organiza-
tion is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following
an election held as provided in section 9(e) within one year preceding the effective date of
such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligi-
ble to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to
make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same
terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as
a condition of acquiring or retaining membership." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3)
(1958).
10 Under the Wagner Act, all types of union security clauses were permitted, including
the closed shop, provided the union was the statutory bargaining representative and not
established, maintained, or assisted by unlawful employer conduct. National Labor Relations
Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
1161 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958).
1964]
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By 1947 twelve states had adopted right-to-work laws, and it is clear
that the general intent of 14(b) was to allow some effect to such state legis-
lation. More specifically, Congress contemplated that 14(b) would permit
states to outlaw union shop agreements, otherwise protected under federal
law."2 The federal preemption doctrine, however, was still in its infancy
at that time, and it would be unrealistic to assume that the members of
Congress had in mind the variety of questions that might arise concerning
the interpretation of 14(b) and its practical application.'3 Even now, some
seventeen years, eight states, and several court decisions later, the answers
to many of the questions are far from clear.
In Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Schermerhorn4 the United States Supreme
Court recently grappled with some of the problems presented by 14(b).
In the 1962 term it ruled that an "agency shop" agreement (one requiring
as a condition of employment that nonmembers pay to the union amounts
equal to initiation fees and dues),15> though otherwise valid under federal
law, 6 was the equivalent of an "agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment" within the meaning of 14(b),
and therefore subject to Florida's right-to-work legislation.
17
In the 1963 term, having continued the case for further argument, the
Court ruled that Florida courts had jurisdiction to enforce that state's
right-to-work law to the extent of enjoining enforcement of the invalid
12 See text accompanying notes 74-76 infra.
13 "Many of these problems [of preemption] probably could not have been, at all events
were not, foreseen by the Congress. Others were only dimly perceived and their precise
scope only vaguely defined." San Diego Bldg. Trade Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240
(1959) (Frankfurter, J.).
14 375 U.S. 96 (1963) ; 373 U.S. 746 (1963) (Separate opinions of same case).
15 The clause in Schermerhorn read: "Employees shall have the right to voluntarily join
or refrain from joining the Union. Employees who choose not to join the Union . . . shall be
required to pay as a condition of employment, an initial service fee and monthly service fees
to the Union . . . and such sums shall in no case exceed the initiation fees and membership
dues paid by those who voluntarily choose to join the Union." Id. at 748-49. The nonmembers
were in fact required to pay the equivalent of initiation fees and membership dues. Id. at 749.
16NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). See text accompanying notes
18-24 infra.
17 In addition to Florida, courts have held agency shop clauses in violation of right-to-
work laws in Kansas, Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456 (1961), and
Nevada, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-
Reno Stage Lines, Inc., 319 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1963) (applying state law) ; cf. Baldwin v.
Arizona Flame Restaurant, Inc., 40 L.R.R.M. 2375. (Ariz. Super. Ct., 1955), aff'd on other
grounds, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957); contra, Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App.
631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959). State attorney general rulings are to the same effect in Nebraska,
Op's. ATT'Y GEN. NEB. No. 173, March 2, 1960; 1958 S.D. ATT'Y GEN. BIENNIAL REP. 221;
and Texas, Ops. ATT'Y GEN. TEX. No. WW-101B, March 14, 1961. But cf. Ors. ATT'Y GEN.
N.D. No. 135, Aug. 24, 1959 (holding service fee valid if limited in amount to costs of repre-
sentation and bargaining. For a discussion, see Note, The Agency Shop and State Right-to-
Work Laws, 35 NOTRE DAs- LAW. 547 (1960).
[Vol. 52:95
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agreement."8 In doing so, the Court rejected the union's contention that
the only effect of 14(b) in a right-to-work state was to remove the agree-
ment from the protection of the 8(a) (3) proviso and render it an unfair
labor practice subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Board.19
In addition, the Court reaffirmed its prior holding in Algoma Plywood &
Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.20 to the effect that a
state has jurisdiction under 14(b) to reinstate with back pay an employee
discharged pursuant to an invalid union security provision covered by that
section. By implication, a state might also have jurisdiction to enjoin eco-
nomic action to enforce such an agreement. But, the Court made dear,
a state court would have no jurisdiction to enjoin or grant damages for
picketing or other activity designed to obtain such an agreement, for the
reason that state power under 14(b) "begins only with actual negotiation
and execution of the type of agreement described by § 14(b;). Absent
such an agreement, conduct arguably an unfair labor practice would be
a matter for the Labor Board under general preemption doctrine.
These rulings are helpful, but there remain serious unanswered ques-
tions that go to the practical effectiveness and scope of state law in this
field.2 First, what type of agreements, if any, in addition to the union shop
and the agency shop, are encompassed within the phrase "agreements re-
quiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment"?
Second, is 14(b) limited to agreements that are valid under federal law, or
does it extend to agreements, like the closed shop, that are invalid? Third,
in either event, what are the respective roles of the state courts and the
Labor Board in the case of an agreement whose status, under federal law
is (a) clearly valid, (b) clearly invalid, (c) unclear?
18375 U.S. 96 (1963).
19 In the first argument before the Supreme Court, the union contended that the status
of the agreement under 14(b) should, in any event, be determined by the Board in the first
instance. This issue is discussed in text accompanying note 80 infra.
20 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
21375 U.S. at 105. (Emphasis in original.) In Local 429, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
AFL v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957), the Court reversed per curiam a
state court injunction based upon a right-to-work law against picketing for an all-union agree-
ment. In doing so, the Court merely cited Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
In Local 438, Constr. & Gen. Laborers Union, AFL-CIO v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963), the
Court again reversed such an injunction, this time stating that 14(b) gave the court on juris-
diction in such a situation. In neither case, however, did the Court make clear the reasoning
set forth in Schermerhorn that such picketing lies "exclusively in the federal domain." 375 U.S.
at 105. Under established jurisdiction doctrines this would mean that states are precluded
from granting damages as well as issuing an injunction. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
2 2 As the Court stated in Schermerhorn: "As a result of § 14(b), there will arise a wide
variety of situations presenting problems of the accommodation of state and federal jurisdic-
tion in the union-security field." 375 U.S. at 105.
19641
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I
WHAT TYPE OF AGREEMENTS REQUIRE UNION "MEMBERSHIP"?
Section 14(b) by its terms is limited to "agreements requiring member-
ship in a labor organization as a condition of employment." Some state
right-to-work laws purport to regulate or prohibit activities that are clearly
beyond that scope, and to that extent they are unenforceable in a situation
subject to Labor Board jurisdiction. For example, a law that purports to
protect the "inherent right of a person to ... bargain freely with his em-
ployer, individually or collectively" 3 could not be applied to negate the
federal principles that a majority union is the exclusive bargaining agent
for all employees within the bargaining unit,' and that a collective contract
takes precedence over any individual agreement.'s At the other extreme
are agreements that expressly require union membership to obtain or keep
a job, and therefore under the literal language of 14(b) are clearly within
state jurisdiction. With respect to them the only issue, so far as 14(b) cov-
erage is concerned, is whether that test is the sole condition to the exercise
of state jurisdiction.'s In Schermerorn, however, the Court held that an
agency shop agreement which did not use the word "membership" in de-
scribing the conditions of employment was nevertheless within the scope
of 14(b), because the conditions it imposed were the "equivalent" of mem-
bership requirements. Thus, the question is whether and to what extent
that reasoning is applicable to other types of agreements.
The Court's reasoning in Schermerhorn was based in part on its deci-
sion in a companion case, NLRB v. General Motors,27 which sustained the
validity of an agency shop clause against an attack under federal law. In
the latter case the Labor Board ordered General Motors to bargain with
the Auto Workers concerning an agency shop clause in an agreement appli-
cable to Indiana,s where such a clause had been held valid under that
23 TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 5207a § 1 (1962). To the same effect in ARx. STAT. ANN.
§ 81-201 (1960), declaring the "freedom of organized labor to bargain individually." In
Louisiana, where the right-to-work law contained no express provision, the supreme court
nevertheless held (in an intra-state situation) that a clause recognizing the union as exclusive
bargaining agent for all employees within the bargaining unit constituted a violation of the law,
because it "abridged" the right of nonmembers to work as they chose. Piegts v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, 228 La. 131, 81 So. 2d 835 (1955). Shortly after this decision the law' was re-
pealed except as to agricultural workers. LA. Rav. STAT. §§ 23:881-89 (Supp. 1963).
2 4 Labor Management Relations Act § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1958). This provision, however, contains a proviso, that employers may adjust grievances
with individual employees, in a manner not inconsistent with the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, provided the union is given an opportunity to be present.
25 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
20 See text accompanying notes 54-77 infra.
27373 U.S. 734 (1963).
28 General Motors Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961), reversing a prior decision in the same
case, 130 N.L.R.B. 481 (1961).
[Vol. 52:95
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state's right-to-work law.2 ' The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
fused to enforce the Board's order on the ground that the clause was invalid
under federal law, reasoning that the proviso to 8(a) (3) protects only
agreements requiring "membership" as a condition of employment, and
the agency clause did not require "membership." 30 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding (1) that Congress intended the proviso to protect not
only the union shop but also lesser forms of union security;3 and (2) that
in any event, since enforcement of a union shop clause under the proviso
can be validly conditioned only upon payment of initiation fees and dues,32
the agency shop clause is "the practical equivalent of union 'membership'
as Congress used that terms in the proviso to Section 8 (a) (3).,33
If the Supreme Court had stopped with the first observation, it might
have concluded in Scher-merhorn that an agency shop clause, though valid
under federal law as a lesser form of union security, was nevertheless not
an agreement requiring "membership" as a condition of employment sub-
ject to 14(b). But having held in General Motors that an agency shop
clause was the "practical equivalent" of "membership" within the meaning
of the 8(a) (3) proviso, a denial of 14(b) coverage over the agency shop
would have required the Court to attach a different meaning to the word
"membership" in the two sections, and this the Court was not prepared to
do. "At the very least," the Court held, "the agreements requring 'member-
2 The UAW did not propose a specific clause, but asked to bargain over one "generally
similar" to the one held valid in Indiana. Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631,
159 N.E.2d 408 (1959). The clause, like the one in Schermerhorn, involved the equivalent of
initiation fees and dues. The basis of the Indiana court's decision, ironically, was that such
an agreement did not involve "membership" within the right-to-work law's scope. The court
relied both upon the fact that Indiana's law did not expressly preclude a requirement of money
payments, and upon the ground that the law contained criminal provisions. Compare cases
cited at note 17 supra.
30 General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, 303 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1962).
3 1 This has been the traditional Labor Board view, See American Seating Co., 98 NL.R.B.
800 (1952) ("support money" equivalent to dues from religious objectors) ; Public Serv. Co.
of Colorado, 89 N.L.R.B. 418 (1950) (service fee equivalent to membership dues). This was
also the view of the Supreme Court in Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (maintenance of membership provision).
3 2 As the Court stated, "'membership' as a condition of employment is whittled down
to its financial core." 373 U.S. at 742. The court thus sanctioned a long-established construction
of the Act that if an employee tenders his initiation fee and dues he may not be required as
condition of employment to take an oath of membership, Union Starch & Ref. Co. v. NLRB,
186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951), or to submit to an initiation or
attend union meetings, Union Bhd. of Carpenters, 115 N.L.R.B. 518 (1956). In General Motors,
the court conceded that under a lawful union security agreement "the employee may have to
become a 'member' in the sense that the union may be able to place him on its rolls," but did
not regard that difference between the union shop and agency shop as significant for purposes
of 14(b). 373 U.S. at 744.
33Id. at 743. The court left open the question posed by an agency shop agreement coupled
with a closed union policy. Id. at 744.
19641
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ship' in a labor union which are expressly permitted by the proviso are the
same 'membership' agreements expressly placed within the reach of state
law by Section 14(b)."84
In Schermerhorn, on appeal, the union sought for the first time to dis-
tinguish the agency shop clause in that case from the one in General Motors
by arguing that theirs was limited to a "service fee" to be used exclusively
for collective bargaining purposes and not for other "institutional pur-
poses unrelated to its execlusive agency functions," whereas the General
Motors clause allowed nonmember contributions to be used "without re-
striction." The Court said it was "wholly unpersuaded" by the attempted
distinction for two reasons: (1) the clause in Schermerorn was ambigu-
ous, and therefore suspectible to an interpretation that would allow non-
members' money to be used for "institutional" purposes; and (2) since
nonmember payments were equal to member payments, even if money from
nonmembers were allocated exclusively to bargaining agency functions,
the nonmember would be paying "more of these expenses than his pro rata
share," thus indirectly subsidizing the union's institutional activities."
The decision thus leaves open, by implication, the possibility that an
agreement requiring payment by nonmembers of a service fee as a condi-
tion of employment may be valid under federal law and yet outside the
reach of state power under 14(b), if limited in amount to the nonmember's
pro rata share of "exclusive agency" functions-that is, those services,
such as bargaining and grievance handing, which a union is required to
perform for members and nonmembers alike under its statutory duty of
fair representation. 0 Obviously, to distinguish between such functions and
34 373 U.S. at 751.
351d. at 752-54. The Court did not expressly consider the possibility that members
might contribute toward institutional functions by way of special assessments. Cf. H. John
Homan Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1962), in which two Board members express the view that
a special service fee is not prima fade discriminatory, even though equivalent in amount to
union dues, because members additionally contribute through initiation fees and assessments.
36 A union acting as statutory bargaining representative has a duty, in negotiation and
administration of the agreement, to represent all employees within the bargaining unit in a
fair and impartial manner. Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (under the
NLRA). Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (under Railway Labor
Act). The duty extends to nonmembers as well as members. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323
U.S. 248, 249, 255-56 (1944), in which the Court stated: "The duties of a bargaining agent
selected under the terms of the Act extend beyond the mere representation of the interests
of its own group members. By its selection as bargaining representative, it has become the
agent of all the employees, charged within the responsibility of representing their interests
fairly and impartially. Otherwise, employees who are not members of a selected union at
the time it is chosen by the majority would be left without adequate representation." More-
over, discrimination against nonmembers in administration of the agreement constitutes an
unfair labor practice within § 8(b) (2). E.g., Bricklayers Local 10, 124 N.L.R.B. 691 (1959).
This duty is apparently enforceable through the courts as well as through the Board. See
Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964) (rejecting by implication Board's exclusive juris-
diction).
[Vol. 52:95
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unrelated "institutional" activities would be difficult, but the Court pro-
vides what may be a clue to its thinking on that matter by citing, with
apparent approval, a portion of the union's brief to the effect that non-
bargaining functions may include political, charitable and educational ac-
tivities, promotion of labor institutions in other countries, financing of
low-cost housing, and financing litigation.37 Once bargaining functions are
identified, to compute their costs and the nonmember's pro rata share poses
a further and formidable accounting task, but perhaps no more difficult
than the analogous duty which the Supreme Court says the Railway Labor
Act imposes in union shop situations. There a union is required to compute
the total and pro rata costs of political and non-political activities so that
a member who declines to contribute toward political expenses may be
given a discount from total dues.3
An alternative to the general service fee impliedly valid under the
reasoning of Schermerhorn, and one more likely to appeal to unions, is a
special fee charged nonmembers for particular services which the union
must provide under its duty of representation. 9 Some agreements, for ex-
ample, impose a charge upon nonmembers for use of the union-maintained
hiring hall, and the Board has sustained these agreements under federal
law in the absence of evidence (1) that the hiring hall is operated in a
discriminatory manner, or (2) that the amount of the fee is not reasonably
related to hiring hall operating costs.4" Presumably similar considerations
apply if a union charges on a separate basis for services rendered or costs
incurred in handling a grievance or arbitration matter for a nonmember. 1
37 373 U.S. at 753 n.6. Other matters institutional in nature would probably include the
maintenance of internal union benefit programs and similar functions. On the other hand,
the financing of certain litigation, for example a suit to compel contract compliance, would
appear to lie within the bargaining function.
3 8 Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). The Court suggests
that the separation be effected by establishment of a separate political fund, as in Britain.
Id. at 122-23. Perhaps the Court is more interested in the principle of separation than in
precise calculation of amounts. Summers, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1962
Term, A.B.A. SECTioN oF LABOR RELATioNs L.w REPORT 1 (1963).
39 Unions, however, may be reluctant to stress the difference between over-all cost of
bargaining functions and institutional functions. But see Spielmans, Bargaining Fee versus
Union Shop, 10 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 609 (1957).
4 0 H. John Homan Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1043 (1962). It is not clear what the general
counsel must prove to show the fee is unreasonable in amount. In Homan, nonmembers
paid $9.00 per month, as opposed to members' dues of $10.00, of which $1.10 was sent to
the International in the form of a per capita assessment. Two Board members would have
held these facts to constitute sufficient, or at least prima fade, evidence of discrimination,
but the majority held it insufficient. Cf. Local 1351, S.S. Clerks & Checkers, 55 LRRM 2390
(Feb. 13, 1964); J. J. Haggerty, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 633 (1962), modified, Local 138 Int'l
Union of Op. Eng'rs, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 130 (2d Cir. 1963); Houston Maritime
Ass'n, 136 N.L.R.B. 1222 (1962); Galveston Maritime Ass'n, 139 N.L.R.B. 352 (1962).
41 Cf. Peerless Tool & Eng'r Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 853 (1955), holding it was an unfair
labor practice for a union to refuse to process grievances for employees willing to pay their
dues but unwilling to pay an assessment to the union strike fund.
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If a general or special service fee agreement lies outside the reach of
state power under 14 (b), it is because the fee is used to support only those
union functions that are available to members and nonmembers alike, and
therefore does not constitute a requirement of "membership" within the
meaning of that section. This conclusion is consistent with the relationship
between 14(b) and the proviso to 8 (a) (3) on either of two theories. First,
as the Court reaffirmed in General Motors, the proviso protects forms of
union security less stringent than the union shop, and a service fee agree-
ment may fall within that category.42 In the first Schermerhorn decision,
the Court expressly left open whether state power under 14(b) reaches
all agreements that depend upon the proviso for their validity under federal
law, deciding only that it at least reaches the union shop and its equivalent
the agency shop.43 It is consistent with the decision, therefore, that a service
fee may be outside 14(b) even though within the 8(a) (3) proviso. 44
Second, and a better analytical approach is that the kind of service fee
we are discussing does not involve the proviso at all, because the fee has
nothing to do with membership. It is not a union security measure and it
is valid under federal law independently of the proviso. In the absence of
the kind of discrimination found to exist in Schermerhorn, where non-
members were required to pay more than their pro rata share for bargaining
services, the prohibition of 8 (a) (3) does not come into play.4" The proviso
would then be relevant only if it were necessary to protect a service fee
arrangement from being held to constitute a prohibited interference with
employee rights under section 7.46 While section 7 protects the right of an
employee not to "assist" a labor organization, a service fee limited to pay-
ments for services received would not appear to violate its principles.4" If
a service fee is valid independently of the proviso, then it is quite clearly
beyond the reach of state power under 14 (b), for the function of that sec-
42 If it does, presumably it must conform to the 30-day requirement. To date, the only
fee arrangements held to be within the "less stringent" category are those requiring the equiv-
alent of union dues, or dues plus initiation fee. See Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96 (1963); 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
43The Court stated that "The connection between the § 8(a) (3) proviso and § 14(b) is
clear. Whether they are perfectly coincident, we need not now decide. ... Whatever the status
of less stringent union-security arrangements, the agency shop is within § 14(b)." 373 U.S.
at 751.
44 Section 14(b) by its terms, however, would appear to reach "less stringent" union
security measures such as the modified union shop or maintenance of membership provision,
which expressly requires membership as a condition of employment.
45 See the hiring hall fee cases cited at note 41 supra.
46 The proviso constitutes a limitation on the application of § 7. See note 3 supra.
47 Cf. Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), in which the Supreme
Court made no comment on the Labor Board's argument that an exclusive hiring hall arrange-
ment by its nature constituted an interference with § 7 rights, even in the absence of dis-
crimination.
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tion, as the Supreme Court stated in Schermerhorn, is to limit the preemp-
tive effect of the proviso.
48
Somewhat similar reasoning is applicable to the status under 14(b) of
a non-discriminatory hiring hall agreement, whereby the union acts as a
referral agency without regard to union membership. Such an agreement is
valid under federal law independently of the 8 (a) (3) proviso, the Supreme
Court having held that, while a hiring hall may encourage union member-
ship, the only encouragement or discouragement banned by the Act is that
which is "accomplished by discrimination. ' 49 Accordingly, such an agree-
ment is not one requiring "membership" within the meaning of 14(b) and
is beyond the reach of state authority. 0 This is the view of the Board,
which held that a non-discriminatory hiring hall agreement is a mandatory
subject of bargaining under federal law, and that its asserted illegality
under a state right-to-work law is no defense to a refusal to bargain charge:
It is abundantly clear that a union-operated non-discriminatory hiring hall
does not, by definition, require membership in that union as a condition of
referral and thus of employment. Rather, the non-discriminatory hiring
hall operates to serve both members and non-members of the Union and
also services employers. An employee seeking a job referral to an employer
having an appropriate contract need not become a member of the union
which is running the hiring hall, nor must he even tender "agency shop"
payments to the union in lieu of membership. In sum, there are no union-
oriented conditions of employment which he is required to satisfy, which
might arguably be considered forms of union security. Furthermore, a re-
view of both Board and Court cases which have dealt with the issue war-
rants no inference that a non-discriminatory hiring hall bears any of the
characteristics of a union security agreement. 51
May a state acquire jurisdiction over a hiring hall agreement on the
ground that in fact it discriminates against nonmembers? Certainly evi-
48373 U.S. at 756-57.
40 Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
5 0 Wyoming's right-to-work law, however, expressly prohibits such an arrangement.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-245.5 (Supp. 1963). The Arkansas Supreme Court has held an exclusive
hiring arrangement invalid under that state's right-to-work law on the ground that it amounts
to a requirement of "affiliation" with the union. Kaiser v. Price-Fewell, Inc., 359 S.W.2d 449
(Ark.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 1955 (1963). To the same effect is Branham v. Miller Elec. Co.,
118 S.E.2d 167 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1961), in which the court assumes "it would be certain, as a prac-
tical matter, that only union members in good standing would be employed"; Cf. Building
Trades Council of Reno v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 P.2d 295 (1955) (interpreting a hiring
provision as meaning that the union will furnish only "union labor"); Sheet Metal Workers
v. Walker, 236 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (contract construed as prohibiting employ-
ment of non-union workers). It does not appear, however, that any of these cases involved
employers within Labor Board jurisdiction.
5 1 Houston Chapter, Ass'n Gen. Contractors of Am. 143 N.L.R.B. 43 (1963). To the same
effect is a Trial Examiner's decision in Tom Joyce Floors, Inc., Case No. 20-CA-2477, pend-
ing before the Board for decision.
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dence of actual operation would be required, since as a matter of federal
law discrimination may not be inferred from an agreement which is non-
discriminatory on its face.r2 But if a hiring hall is operated in a discrimina-
tory manner, its operation constitutes an unfair labor practice under fed-
eral law, subject to Labor Board jurisdiction;"S and whether 14(b) gives
states concurrent jurisdiction in such a situation is a question considered
in the next section.
II
STATE AUTHORITY TO REMEDY UNION SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THAT
VIOLATE FEDERAL LAW
The language of the Schermerhorn opinion, which describes state power
to proscribe union security arrangements under 14(b), is broadly phrased.
The Court states that "Congress ... chose to abandon any search for uni-
formity in dealing with the problems of state laws barring the execution
and application of agreements authorized by Section 14 (b) and decided to
suffer a medley of attitudes and philosophies on the subject."' There are
difficulties, however, with an assumption that the Court meant to sweep
within this generalization an agreement that on its face or in its application
violates federal as well as state law. It is one thing to conclude, as the
Court has, that Congress intended to authorize states to pursue their own
policies in the prohibition of agreements that are tolerated by federal law,
and quite another to conclude that the states may also pursue their policies
with respect to agreements or conduct already forbidden by federal law.
Some of the consequences of a broad interpretation of Schermerhorn should
be considered in appraising the scope of the Court's language.
If both the Board and states may assume jurisdiction over precisely
the same agreement, there will be duplication and possible conflict in fed-
eral and state remedies, even when the agreement expressly conditions em-
ployment on union membership. For example, complaints against a closed
shop agreement in a right-to-work state could be lodged with either a state
court or the Board, or both, thereby setting in motion differing procedures
and inviting separate remedial action.rs The Board's jurisdiction would
presumably not be affected by the pendency of the state suit, or even by
52 Local 357 Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961).
53 Ibid.
54375 U.S. 96, 104-05 (1963).
5 5 As the Court noted in Schermerhorn, state right-to-work laws contain "a wide variety
of sanctions, including injunctions, damage suits, and criminal penalties." 375 U.S. at 104-05.
Under 10(c) of the Act, the Board is authorized to issue a cease and desist order against
enforcement of the agreement, and to require the reinstatement with back pay of any employees
discriminated against under the agreement. 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1958).
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a decision of the state court, since section 10(a) of the act provides that
the Board's decisional "power shall not be affected by any other means of
adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agree-
ment, law, or otherwise."" The effect on state jurisdiction of the pendency
of a concurrent Board proceeding, or a Board determination, is not clear.
If 14(b) does authorize concurrent jurisdiction in this class of unfair labor
practice cases, it would appear that an argument for deference to federal
authority would have to be based on principles of comity, and not pre-
emption." In short, the Board and the state courts could find themselves
in competition when effectuating their respective remedial powers, a situ-
ation which has long been considered inimical to the purposes of the Act."8
Conflict in remedies is not the only potential difference in treatment to
which union security cases may be subject if the Board's unfair labor prac-
tice jurisdiction in this field is to be shared with the states. The determina-
tion of whether an employer and a union have by agreement conditioned
employment on union membership may call for fact finding and the appli-
cation of legal principles that could well produce different factual and legal
conclusions. An arrangement that one tribunal finds to be a discriminatory
agreement might be found a legitimate practice by another. This kind of
situation is most likely to arise in cases involving alleged discriminatory
application of otherwise lawful agreements, or in practices which are not
reflected in written agreements. State right-to-work laws have frequently
been invoked in such cases, including the discriminatory operation of a hir-
ing hall,"0 the discharge of an employee because of his union membership
GO 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
5 Compare Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964), where the Board's superseding
authority under 10(a) was recognized in the situation where the Act has expressly provided
for duplicating remedial authority of the Board and the courts. This case, however, is prob-
ably not controlling with respect to the problem under discussion, since the duplication of
remedy involved jurisdiction to enforce contracts. Principles of federal labor law govern the
interpretation of collective bargaining contracts, Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) ; thus, it is quite possible to argue consistently that courts are required
to apply Board decisional law in such cases, but not in cases where 14(b) has vested states
with authority to enforce their own policies.
68Perhaps the best statement is in Garner v. Teamsters Union 346 U.S. 485 (1953), a
landmark preemption case. The case involved picketing to compel the unionization of a place
of business, conduct which "fell within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board
to prevent unfair labor practices." Id. at 487. The Court observed that "when two separate
remedies are brought to bear on the same activity, a conflict is imminent." Id. at 498. It then
rejected the argument that a state remedy against unfair labor practice activity is consistent
with federal policy. "A multiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt
to produce incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive law."
Id. at 490-91. Compare the observation of Mr. Justice Holmes in Charleston & W. Car. Ry.
v. Varnville Furn. Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915): "When Congress has taken the particular
subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition."
59 Taylor v. Hoisting Eng'rs, 189 Kan. 137, 368 P.2d 8 (1962).
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or nonmembership when no agreement is involved, s0 picketing to force the
discharge of non-union employees and the hiring of union members, 1 and
other actions which the Board would find to violate the Act." Discrimina-
tion of this kind, indeed, is more prevalent than the enforcement of a closed
shop contract, for few employers and unions enter into such obviously
illegal agreements.
Discrimination cases that call for an evaluation of factual evidence are
of course commonplace in Board decisional law, with a well defined set
of rules and remedies applicable to them. If the states have concurrent
jurisdiction to make their own factual determinations and to apply their
own law under 14(b), much of the Act that heretofore has been considered
amenable to the preemption doctrine can no longer be said to be within the
Board's exclusive jurisdiction. It is not inconceivable that the encroach-
ment upon Board authority in this area could be extended to states without
right-to-work statutes, for 14(b) does not expressly exclude state deci-
sional law as a source of policy for acting against union security arrange-
ments or their applications.
63
The area of potential conflict which has been described would be ma-
terially narrowed if the state jurisdiction that 14(b) authorizes is limited
to written union security agreements. Obviously, there is far less oppor-
tunity for differences in adjudications with respect to a written union secur-
ity provision than with respect to factual practices and oral arrangements.
The language of 14(b) speaks of "the execution or application of agree-
ments," which is ambiguous.64 The Supreme Court, however, has empha-
60 Self v. Taylor, 217 Ark. 953, 235 S.W.2d 45 (1950); Lunsford v. City of Byran, 156
Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115 (1957); In Self, the court determined that an unwritten practice
of discrimination was subject to the Arkansas right-to-work law, no less than a written agree-
ment. 217 Ark. at 957, 235 S.W.2d at 49.
61 Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 40 L.R.R.M. 2375 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1955);
Gallespie Constr. Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 32 LRRM 2383, May 18, 1953
(Fla. Cir. Ct.).
62 See note 6 supra for a description of some of the right-to-work laws that expressly
overlap into areas which have ordinarily been regarded as subject to exclusive regulation by the
Labor Board.
63 Section 14(b) refers generally to "State or Territorial law." See text accompanying
note 11 supra. In Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950), the Court observed that
for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, at least, "the fact that state policy is expressed
by the judicial organ of the state rather than by the legislature we have repeatedly ruled to
be immaterial." Compare the dictum of the Ohio Supreme Court in Grimes & Hauer v. Pollack,
163 Ohio 372, 380, 127 N.E.2d 203, 207 (1955) that 14(b) refers only to constitutional or
statutory enactment.
64 Compare 8(e) of the Act, which imposes a different kind of contractual regulation, but
expressly includes "any contract or agreement, express or implied." 73 State. 542 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. IV, 1959).
It is at least arguable that the wording of 8(e) shows that Congress knew how to
include an implied agreement in its regulation, and that the reference in 14(b) to "the execu-
tion or application of agreements" is thus limited to express contracts.
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sized that "state power, recognized by 14(b), begins only with actual
negotiation and execution of the type of agreement described by Section
14(b)."1' If this language is to be read to preclude that jurisdiction over
implied agreements, i.e., practices and oral arrangements which are alleged
to discriminate on the basis of union membership, a considerable amount
of case law under the right-to-work statutes must be regarded, on that
ground alone, as wrongly decided.36 It would appear that if 14(b) is to be
restricted to written agreements, the Supreme Court will have to inform
the states that this is the correct delineation of their authority. Continu-
ation of the existing decisional law under right-to-work statutes will en-
courage conflict with the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction, as long
as concurrent jurisdiction is exercised in this area.
The potential for conflict, of course, does not alone require an interpre-
tation of the Act which denies concurrent jurisdiction. Under the preemp-
tion doctrine "the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone,"67 and
there are plainly areas in which Congress has provided for a duplication of
remedies. Perhaps the most obvious is the grant of judicial power in sec-
tion 303 to award damages for certain kinds of union unfair labor prac-
tices. There is no escape here from the possibility of conflicting and com-
peting litigation. All that can be said is that Congress expressly departed
in section 303 from the concept of national uniformity in the administra-
tion of federal labor policy.6" The same observation must now be made
with respect to section 301 of the Act, which provides for Court awards of
damages in actions brought on collective bargaining contracts. To the ex-
tent that the alleged breach of contract may constitute an unfair labor
practice, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the existence of concurrent
6 5 Local 1625, Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 105 (1963). (Emphasis
in original.) The statement was made in explanation of earlier rulings that economic action
undertaken to obtain union security agreements "lies exclusively in the federal domain." Ibid.
Accordingly, its implications as to the somewhat different problem regarding the kinds of
agreements included within 14(b) should not be pressed too far.
QG Right-to-work laws frequently cover matters other than discrimination resulting from
written agreements. See note 6 supra.
07 Retail Clerks Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
6 8 The Supreme Court has held in ILWU v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237, 244 (1952),
that sections 303 and 8(b) are "independent of each other." The potential conflict inherent in
such independence is best illustrated in two decisions handed down the same day by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. United Brick Workers v. Deena Artware, 198
F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 344 U.S. 897 (1952); NLRB v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d
645 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953). In the latter decision the court upheld
the Board's conclusion that the union involved did not violate the secondary boycott pro-
visions of the Act, but in United Brick Workers the Court upheld the federal district court's
conclusion in a section 303 action that the union had engaged in a secondary boycott. The
two cases arose out of the same labor dispute and involved the same conduct, but inconsistent
factual findings were made by the respective tribunals, and the court of appeals found support
for both in the respective records.
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jurisdiction between the Board and the courts. 9 These exceptions to the
preemption doctrine, however, are premised on express statutory provisions
that necessarily contemplate the possibility of non-uniformity. The Court
has made clear that "different principles are applicable" to section 301 or
303 cases involving preemption problems, and decisions arising under these
sections do not necessarily apply in other areas.W
The history of the preemption doctrine in labor law shows that the
most cogent evidence of congressional intent, either expressed in specific
statutory wording or in reliable explanations of legislative purpose, is re-
quired to warrant departure from that doctrine.71 There is no cogent evi-
dence of congressional intent to allow concurrent jurisdiction under 14 (b),
To the contrary, the legislative history of that section, as summarized in
Schermerhorn, discloses apprehension that the proviso to 8(a) (3), in the
absence of a clarifying amendment, might "authorize [union security]
arrangements ... in states where such arrangements were contrary to the
state policy," 72 rather than a desire to add the "wide variety of sanctions"
afforded in state law to the remedies available in federal law against
agreements outlawed by the act.73
In Algoma Plywood v. NLRB,74 the Court described 14(b) as designed
to leave the states "free to pursue their own more restrictive policies in
the matter of union-security agreements." 75 There now is little doubt that
this description accurately encompasses Congress's main concern in the
adoption of 14(b), namely the preservation of local authority to reject
union security arrangements that federal law accepts. Both Algoma and
Sciermertorn are consistent with the proposition that this was all 14(b)
69 Carey v. Westinghouse, 375 U.S. 261 (1964); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S.
195 (1962).
70 Local 100, Plumbers Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693 n.1 (1964).
71 See, e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468 (1955); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Local 207, Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701
(1963). An exception exists in cases involving union violence or public disorder, that may
constitute unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. See, e.g., UAW v.
Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd,, 351 U.S. 266
(1956); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum, 347 U.S. 656 (1954). As explained in the
Garmon case, "State jurisdiction has prevailed in these situations because the compelling state
interest in the scheme of our federalism, in the maintenance of domestic peace is not overriden
in the absence of dearly expressed congressional direction." 359 U.S. at 247. As shown in the
opinions in the foregoing cases, the legislative history of the 1947 amendments to the act
strongly supports the conclusion that in this area, at least, existing local remedies were not
to be disturbed by the act's proscription against restraint and coercion of employees.
72
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. 60 (1947).
73 375 U.S. at 100.
74336 U.S. 301 (1949). The Schermerhorn and Algoma cases are the only occasions in
which the Supreme Court has dealt with the scope of 14(b).
75 336 U.S. at 314. (Emphasis added.)
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was intended to accomplish, for the agreements in both cases were valid
under federal law.7" Moreover, the insistence in Schermerhorn that union
conduct in attempting to obtain a union security clause is subject to exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction7 7 suggests that the Court did not wish to press
the exception to federal preemption beyond the requirements of the case.
On balance, due regard for the legislative purpose in enacting section
14 (b), together with a proper concern for avoiding the problems inherent
in duplicating the Board's authority to remedy unfair labor practices,
argue strongly in favor of limiting the language of Sckermerhorn to the
particular facts involved.
In:
THE RESPECTIVE ROLES OF THE BOARD AND STATE
COURTS IN UNION SECURITY CASES
If, as has been suggested, the Board alone has adjudicatory authority
with respect to union security agreements that violate federal law, it would
follow that state courts must decline jurisdiction in all union security
cases except those in which the validity of the agreement under federal
law is established beyond question. Thus, cases involving contract lan-
guage that plainly falls within federal proscription are automatically
removed from state control, and become subject to well established Board
decisional law. Similarly, in situations in which the alleged violation turns
not upon contract language, but upon factual findings of discrimination,
the Board alone would be competent to make the determination. Thus,
a finding that an employee was denied employment because of nonmem-
bership in a union would establish a federal unfair labor practice, which
can be remedied only by the Board, and a contrary finding would estab-
lish an absence of discrimination, and thereby the inapplicability of 14(b).
In either alternative, the state court may not act.7 8 Absent a written union
7 0 The Supreme Court has not hesitated to confine its decisions in the labor field to a
narrower area than its language might justify in order to maintain coherency in the rules of
federal preemption. See the treatment of Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490
(1949) in Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, 348 U.S. 468, 481 n.9 (1955), and the treatment of United
Const. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), in San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 248 n.6 (1959).
77375 U.S. at 105.
78 This treatment of the jurisdictional question is in accord with the conventional pre-
emption rule that the Board, and not the state courts, has primary authority to adjudicate
cases which may fall within its regulatory power. As stated in Garner v. Teamsters Local 776,
346 U.S. 485, 489 (1953): "It is not necessary or appropriate for [the Court] to surmise how
the National Labor Relations Board might have decided this controversy had petitioners pre-
sented it to that body. The power and duty of primary decision lies with the Board .... !
19641
HeinOnline -- 52 Cal. L. Rev. 111 1964
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
security agreement, this principle would govern most hiring hall cases and
other situations involving job discrimination.
Service fee cases present a different analytical problem. If the fee
charged is not equivalent to "membership" obligations, perhaps because
it is limited to payments for bargaining services, then a state court would
lack jurisdiction because 14(b) is inapplicable. 9 If, on the other hand,
the fee is equivalent to "membership," as in Schermerhorn, then a state
court would have jurisdiction under 14(b) if the service fee clause is
valid under federal law. Given a fee that imposes a requirement of union
membership, its validity under a federal law turns on whether it meets
the tests of the 8(a) (3) proviso. It is conceivable that such a clause may
so obviously meet those tests that deference to Board jurisdiction would
be superfluous. In many cases, however, such questions as whether the
clause allows the proper waiting period, or whether one union involved
is the statutory bargaining agent for the employees concerned, present at
least arguable grounds for federal invalidity, and thus require initial deter-
mination by the Board.
There is nothing in the Schermerhorn decisions to discourage an appli-
cation of the preemption rule which gives the Board sole adjudicatory
authority with respect to cases that may involve unfair labor practices, if
the Board also may be said to enjoy exclusive jurisdiction over violations
of the Act in the union security area. In the first opinion, the Court pays
due respect to the principle that the "assessment of any union-security
arrangement for the purposes of §§ 7, 8 and 14(b), when there is signifi-
cant doubt about the matter, is initially a task for the Board, so that it
may finally come to this Court with the benefit of the affected agency's
views.. . ."80 The case was not disposed of on this ground only because
the Board had fully expressed its views on the matter, and there was no
"reason to hold our hand at this juncture in order that the Board may
arrive again at what is now a foregone conclusion." 8' This exception to
the preemption rule is in accord with the Garmon decision.82
It should be observed that, as a practical matter, there is little occa-
sion for the Board to make a substantive ruling on the scope of 14(b),
except when an alleged unfair labor practice is involved. Service fee and
hiring clauses make unpromising cases for unfair labor practice charges
in the absence of a showing of discrimination, except perhaps when an
79 See text accompanying notes 44-48 supra.
80373 U.S. 746, 755 (1963).
81 Id. at 756.
82 The Court made allowance in Garmon for the operation of state authority where the
Board has made a "clear determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohibited"
or where there is "compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts." 359 U.S. at 246.
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employer refuses to bargain about them.s Referral of non-discriminatory
clauses to the Board might well result in the dismissal of a charge by
the General Counsel's office without indicating whether the agreement is
subject to section 14(b). To the extent that these clauses may be found
not to deal with union membership, however, it would seem sensible for
state courts to dismiss the proceeding on that ground. This entails an
initial decision by the state court as to the scope of 14(b), but may be
warranted when there is no basis for concluding that an unfair labor
practice is involved. Examination by the state court of the section 14(b)
problem is inherent in any union security case, since it is always possible
that state jurisdiction may be proper under that provision as in the
Schermerhorn and Algoma cases. A determination of an absence of state
jurisdiction on the ground that union membership is not involved is
scarcely different, from the standpoint of protecting the integrity of the
Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction, from a determination that 14 (b)
authorizes a state remedy.
However that may be, the Schermerhorn decisions reflect no back-
tracking from the rules that allocate responsibility to the Board for making
initial decisions in cases which are within its exclusive province. If the
Board has retained an area of exclusive competence to deal with union
security matters, unaffected by section 14(b), the usual consequences
should follow with respect to the division of authority between the Board
and the states in handling cases.
IV
CONCLUSION
In summary, our analysis yields the following conclusions:
1. Section 14(b) grants states authority to proscribe by law the union
shop and its equivalent, the agency shop.
2. Pursuant to such a state law, state courts may declare these agree-
ments to be unlawful, may enjoin their enforcement, and may reinstate
with back pay an employee denied employment as a result of the invalid
agreement.
3. Since state jurisdiction arises only with the negotiation and execu-
tion of the invalid agreement, state courts may not enjoin or grant damages
for union activity aimed at obtaining the agreement.
8 3 The same may be said for service fee agreements which contain 30-day grace periods,
and thus satisfy the conditions of the proviso to 8(a) (3), assuming that they are subject to the
proviso in the first place.
1964]
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4. A non-discriminatory service fee charged to nonmembers and lim-
ited to either a pro rata share of the actual cost of bargaining services
(a general service fee) or particular services such as grievance handling
or hiring hall administration (a special service fee) is probably beyond
the reach of state power under 14(b).
5. A non-discriminatory hiring hall agreement is not subject to state
control under 14(b) since it does not involve membership as a condition
of employment.
6. State authority under 14(b) arguably applies only to express writ-
ten agreements.
7. In any event, state authority under 14(b) does not extend to agree-
ments or practices which are invalid under federal law.
8. State courts should defer to the jurisdiction of the Board in the
case of any agreement or practice that is arguably an unfair labor prac-
tice under federal law.
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